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Introduction: the historical problem 
Few British political leaders have been so successful and sig- 
nificarnt as Stanley Baldwin. Yet few have suffered so much 
belittlement and abuse in retirement, and later biographers and 
historians have had considerable difficulty in producing plausible 
explanations for his ascendancy. More nonsense has been written 
about him than about any other modern prime minister. This has 
had consequences for wider understandings of twentieth-century 
Britain, as interpretations of his politics are integral to several 
major debates: on the Conservative party's long-term electoral 
dominance, on constitutional issues, on `national culture', and on 
Britain's industrial, imperial, and international decline. 
This book is not concerned primarily with recounting Baldwin's 
life. Rather, it concentrates upon defining the nature of his poli- 
tics, identifying its sources, examining its expressions, and 
assessing its impact. It aims to contribute to a fuller grasp of 
larger issues, especially the character and success of modern Con- 
servatism. In doing so, it suggests a method for creating new 
understandings of' British political leaders, by directing attention 
towards their widest public functions - not just to their particular 
party and ministerial roles, but to their relationships with the elec- 
torate, opposing parties, and the media, and to their interaction 
with `political culture'. 
I 
Baldwin was Conservative leader for fourteen years from 1923 to 
1937, and prime minister three times, from 1923 to 1924,1924 
to 1929, and 1935 to 1937. He led his party to larger electoral 
victories than any other twentieth-century party leader. If his four 
years, from 1931 to 193,,, as deputy to MacDonald within the 
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`-National' government are included, he also led it for a longer 
period in office than anyone except Thatcher. What makes his 
career still more significant is that these successes were achieved 
in new and difficult conditions. Aside from Bonar Law's brief 
(seven-month) tenure in 1922-3, Baldwin was the first Conserva- 
tive prime minister to preside over a truly mass democracy, with 
universal suffrage - female as well as male, and overwhelmingly 
working class. He was certainly the first to feature on the modern 
mass media of. radio and sound film. He was the first to bear the 
political impact of' prolonged economic depression and mass 
unemployment in the traditional manufacturing and mining 
areas, and the first to face a major socialist party and highly politi- 
cised trade-union leadership. He became the first leader- of oppo- 
sition to a Labour government, and the only prime minister to 
confront a general strike. His reputation was made in 1922 by 
helping to free the Conservative party from a coalition govern- 
ment, vet in 1 y3 1 he led it into another and more enduring coalit- 
ion. During his leadership the British overseas dominions moved 
from Empire to C. omnmonwealth, and Indian nationalists mounted 
their greatest civil-disobedience campaigns. The last great strug- 
gle between free trade and protection was fOught, and sterling 
suffered its first and most spectacular devaluation. Baldwin was 
also the first Conservative leader to be confronted by Stalinist and 
fascist ideologies, and the first who had to justify rearmament to 
an electorate apprised of' the horrors of' modern aerial bombard- 
ment, steeped in anti-war feeling, and placing its trust in inter- 
national peace-keeping. He remains the only prime minister to 
have superintended a royal abdication. 
Such were the hazardous conditions for the leader of a party 
long identified with hierarchy, privilege, monarchy, property, 
sound finance, imperialism, and the armed services. Not simply 
Conservative party interests but the very structures and values 
which sustained those interests seemed under threat, and there 
were sharp disagreements among Conservatives about how best 
to react. In these circumstances Baldwin's resilience and success 
were remarkable. Few political careers have veered so often 
between such high peaks and such low troughs. fie survived 
several party rebellions, and two attempted coups by senior col- 
leagues. He suffered sustained criticism from conservative mass- 
circulation newspapers, and the most serious organisational and 
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electoral challenges ever mounted by newspaper owners. He 
defeated or out-manoeuvred many of the leading public figures of 
his time - 
Lloyd George, Asquith, MacDonald, Birkenhead, Austen 
and Neville Chamberlain, Beaverbrook, Bishop Temple, King 
Edward VIII, and Churchill. He lost two general elections, in 1923 
and 192g, but on both occasions Conservatives retained the larg- 
est share of the popular vote and denied their opponents an overall 
parliamentary majority. Those defeats were amply recouped in the 
landslide victories of' 1q24,1931, and 1935, when Conservatives 
secured majorities of over 200 seats, and in the last two elections 
the largest popular support of modern times. Baldwin also enjoyed 
more personal parliamentary triumphs than any other twentieth- 
century party leader. In the mid 192os and again in the mid iq3os 
he commanded an extraordinary national ascendancy, surpassed 
only by Churchill from 194() to 1945- To criticise him at Con- 
servative meetings during the 1930s was said to be 'little short of 
blasphemy'. If an TN1P 
interrupted him while speaking in the House 
of' Commons 'it seemed almost like brawling in church'. ' During 
the 1937 Coronation he shared the popular applause with the ne\. % 
King and Queen. Unusually for a party leader he retired at a time 
of his own choosing, amidst wvarin tributes not just from his own 
party but from his opponents - 
in Churchill's words, `loaded with 
honours and enshrined in public esteem'. ' 
II 
The problems in interpreting Baldwin's career have generated a 
succession of unusually unpleasant, divided, and amorphous his- 
torical reputations. His contemporaries had been perplexed bx 
him. His rise to high office was rapid and unexpected, a surprise 
magnified by his own insistence that he was just an ordinary, 
simple, man.. jocular public statement a week before he became 
prime minister - that 
he looked forward to retiring to his native 
Worcestershire 'to read the books I want, to live a decent life, and 
to keep pigs" - came to 
define an image, but also a problem. Ile 
C. Prtru", (. hanten o/. 11t 1. ye (1 c), 7)cr), pp. Ifir,, º7 t; T.. ]unc",. 'tit. ºrrlc"\ Bald%A in*, 1)N7>' p. ,, u. 
. 
1. Ramuirn. The : 1. ýe n/ Bal/our and 13alda in (º 97K ), P. :;. r t; . 
ltt irc" and Sinclair in ll(. Deb 
:; -'4. rc. 
tit(2-. 4 (: { 1 : 11av t 4:;; ): (: ripps 
to Baldwin. :; t: 1tav I c):; 7, SB 1., -, 2, - 170, W. S. 
Churchill. 7hr Second World It itr, vol. I: The (; alhenrr,,, Storm ( ºy-tt{l. p. t 8. 
Bclatrdiv repurtrd in The T, mrs. 2:: 1taC 102't. 
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had been an industrialist, yet seemed to be a countryman. He was 
a politician who could appeal- to be non-political. He had literate 
and cultural interests yet paraded a dislike of' intellectuals; he 
disdained oratory yet made impressive speeches. Dramatic 
decisions and sharp reversals of' fortune during his first two years 
as leader deepened the mystery. He could seem both sedate and 
impulsive, appear ineffective vet transform the political landscape. 
He made serious mistakes, only to rebound with great successes. 
He often looked vulnerable but proved to be irremovable, a politi- 
cal innocent vet able to beat the most formidable opponents. Con- 
temporary commentators described him as an `enigma', and 
searched for the 'real' Baldwin. Profile-writers and memoirists 
predicted that he would 'puzzle the future historian'. ' 
Within four years of' his ministerial retirement many thought 
there was no puzzle at all, as he became a principal victim in an 
enduring denigration of the dominant elements of'interwar public 
life. No other former prime minister's reputation has collapsed so 
completely and so swiftly, nor turned upon so few sentences. ' 
Munich, the outbreak of'war, and Dunkirk created an atmosphere 
in which earlier criticisms by Conservative `anti-appeasers of 
Bald-win's reactions to German rearmament became widely 
accepted across the political spectrum, and were expanded into it 
('olTlprehenslve Indictment. A misjudged passage in it November 
1 c), j() speech was seized upon as proof that, following a severe 
by-election defeat at East Fulham in 1y,;, i, he had minlnllse(1 the 
German danger and delayed British rearmament until the 1cf3; ) 
election had been \\-on - resulting in Ineffective 
deterrence, diplo- 
matic humiliation, and military reverses. Most vividly in Guilt) 
Men by 'Cato' (Michael Foot, Peter Howard, and Frank (.. )w-en) and 
most savagely in an article by A. L. Rowse and in the popular 
press, it was asserted that Baldwin had deceived and betrayed the 
nation because his preference. sustained by ruthless party nlan- 
agement, had always been for doing nothing except retaining 
power. lie seemed ordinary and simple precisely because he was 
ordinary and simple; for `Cato' a `little man', fm- George Orwell 
A. (,. (: archnrt. (. trtarn People u/ Irnßurtnrrrr (t tl_ýti), Itl,. t-8; NN' Sired. The Real . 
S'tnrrlrt 
h'nldr, rn(ºt), icr); B. ftuhrrtti. Stcrnlet Ba/di, rrr. . 
Unrr or . 
llrrrulr. ' ( ltl; ilil; L. S. Atnrrý, 1/t 
I'nlrhrnl Lr/r. ,i ýulý. ( Itl;, '; -: r). II. . itý: r 
[in littler rsantinatum. srr P Wlliatu, un. 'lialthNln'ý, llruutattun*. lurthccmunu. 
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`simply a hole in the air'. " A legitimate attempt to preserve his 
own property - the ornamental gates to 
his home, requisitioned 
for scrap metal - 
brought violent public abuse and hate mail. ' 
Much of' the criticism came from writers on the left who pre- 
f'erred to forget Labour and Liberal opposition to government 
rearmament during the mid 193os; it became a standard anti- 
Conservative weapon for radical publicists preparing for the 
post-war general election. " Yet criticism was also fostered by a 
Conservative newspaper proprietor and minister - 
Beayerbrook 
(employer of the Guilty Men authors) - seeking revenge 
in a quar- 
rel that long pre-dated rearmament, and it went largely unchal- 
lenged by other Conservatives no\%" cloaking themselves in the 
Churchillian mantle. By 1945 Baldwin had been erased from the 
party's public memory, his name avoided in election literature and 
speeches. " Passages from his addresses, quoted or anthologised in 
innumerable interwar celebrations of English politics and culture, 
vanished from the equally numerous celebrations published in the 
1()4()s. After his death in 1947 his principal memorial was a 
simple monument by the roadside near his Worcestershire home - 
it poignant contrast to his national acclaim in 1937 (plate 15). 
The critical verdict now received the imprimatur of' Churchill's 
war memoirs, the index of' which encapsulated the indictment: 
'great party manager', 'aversion to foreign problems'. excludes 
Churchill from office' and, famously, 'conf'esses putting party 
before country'. 1" To this was added a Keynesian historiography 
which, forgetting that Baldwin was not a social democrat and 
discounting imperial protectionism as an alternative - even 
credible - political economy, extended the charges of' neglect and 
failure to the issues of economic depression and mass unemploy- 
ment. A broad consensus, Labour-C: hiirchillian-Keynesian, 
A. Salter, 
. 
Seruntr (i939A pp. 19-4-7: '(: wo'. (=u, It 
-ilrn 
(Jut 1(404 pp. 17-21.25-7. 
3! '1-7: A. L. Rowse, 'Reflect Ions on Lord Bald%s in'. Political Quarterh 12 (I (4 t ), 3"5-1 7, 
reprinted in Rosse. The 1". 'nd uj an 1: ßo-h M447). pp. 77-89: press extracts in \1&B 
pp. t (º, ºh- 7. 
G. Orwell. The Lion and the 1 "nirurn 11941: Penguin rein, WHO .}), 
p. ,, ti. 
For the . tore of the Astlrý Hall Kates and examples ol'thr abuse. see M&B pp. ºcº,, fi--Ei,;. 
E. g. '(; raechus', Your M. P. (tg. }4). p. i,: 1'. L. Ilorabin, Politico Afadr Plain (Penguin 
special, t4-}. }). pp. 49-5(1- 
j Rarnsden, The . 1, {ße n/ Churchill and h'rlrn (t 44rº1, p. ? fin. and srr pp. 171-2. An exception 
\e as Q. I l)lgg. The 1. r4t Wa% . 
frier Right (194: 7) I. pp. ;, 4.57- i5- 
Churchill, (: athenn,; . 
Storer, p. 697, and see pp. , io, M(º. t li t. 181.198.199. 
Churchill nevertheless contributed to the Baldwin memorial, and spoke at its unvriline 
in IO., O M&B p. I072. 
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became entrenched. It entered the textbooks, and it remains a 
common impression, perpetuated even by some of' the better his- 
torians. " Forty years after the war Michael Foot, by then Labour 
party leader but still brandishing Guilt)' Alen, was able to block a 
proposal to place a statue of, Baldwin alongside those of' other 
prime ministers in the Houses of Parliament. '2 
So compelling were the perspectives of'the i 94os that they were 
accepted by Baldw-in's official biographer, G. M. Young, and - 
almost as damagingly - did not seem to be contested by his friend 
and chief obituarist, Tom , 
Jones, '' nor by his surviving Cabinet 
colleagues. " In mitigation Young argued that, during the General 
Strike and the Abdication especially, Baldwin had preserved the 
constitution and national unity. But his `explanations' of'the main 
points of'censure only added further criticisms: indolence, irresol- 
ution, inattention to foreign affairs, even negligence of official 
duties, underlain by an inordinate personal need to retain public 
affection. '' Baldwin, a reluctant biographical subject but stung by 
critics who in his view lacked 'historical sense', had been per- 
suaded by friends to commission Young because he thought a his- 
torian who had written Portrait of an Age (1936) and seemed to 
share his own distaste f()r 'the modern psychological approach in 
biographies' would be well equipped to `picture the mentality' of 
E. g. B. Pirnlott, 'Man. More Pygmies than (; tang. The Independent on . 
Sundae, 4 April 
iqq : 'Bald.. in neglected Iu rearm against Hitler'. 
J. (: ritchlr\, '1\'h. v Baldwin Deserves a Place in the Ilouse',. J. Ilavilan(l, 'Baldwin Must 
Wait for his Commons St attic', and _Ith 
Earl Baldwin letter, The Time,, 27 Feb.. 5, to 
March I(82. Guilh Men .. as rc-published in ºy()8 as a Penguin '1'.. wrntieth (: rntun 
(: Iasi(' (m), with a nr. % preface In Foot. The introduction, h. John Stevenson, gives 
nits the slightest rtuhcation of ho. % little Ohr hook has withstood subsequent scholarl 
sc ruIin . 
. 
Junes drafted his obituary in 1937. but \shrn revising it to 1941 felt unable to 'appraise' 
the reartnanient cunirovers\ (Jones papers A, ). %Vhat stuck - and was adoptr(I b\ 
Young - \%as tilt, suggestion of 'indolence'. ()nil a shortened version Was published in 
The Time. 1., Dec. 1(447. but the full text appeared as a pamphlet, Lard Balduvn. :1 
. 
1lemnir ( 1947). Jones's revic%% of Young's hook, to The Observer. Ifi \o%. 10't Its 
c rntral charges intact, and Y'oung's interpretation influenced Jones's article on Baldwin 
in the 1). 1B. written i q),; {. 1'rt as 'P. Q. R. ' in The . 5'pr"etat(lr. 7 . 
June 1 y';. -, 
. 
Jones had 
praised Baldwin for making possible the 'drastic air rearmament 'no.. in operation 
:. g. reviews of (; MY In L. S Amrr\, The Spectator, 14 \o\. Iq, r2: 
Lord Norwich (Uuff 
Cooper). The Dail) Mail, 14 No . 10,7)2: 
W. Elliot, Time and Tide. Ir Nov. I q., 2. Amen's 
critic isms in All Political Li/e became part i( ularl influential. 
(; MY, esp. pp. 2a" rent-S, fi i ;. -, 2,100- 106,120--2.126,1'_8,1(i7,182.200,204 Ill 
June I Young had shown himself markedly Irss worried al out (; erinanc than Baldwin 
had alread\ been for two \tars: see AWB pp. 34q-. r 5o. 
ý 
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the interwar years. '") Young, however, approached his task in 
exactly the manner Baldwin had feared, one which encouraged 
the substitution of speculation and innuendo for what Young con- 
sidered to be the inadequacies of his private papers as source 
material. Finding `the psychology of the subject ... so absorbing 
that the history ... mov[ed] 
further and further into the back- 
ground', '' Young initiated another persistent strand of* interpret- 
ation - where psychological or temperamental supposition 
replaces adequate historical explanation. 
However, a reaction to this historiography had already begun, 
with Bassett's demonstration that Baldwin's alleged `confession' 
on the difficulties of'rearmament had been misrepresented. Bald- 
win's November i q), 16 statement had in fact referred to conditions 
well before the 1935 election, and at that election he had sought 
a mandate to expand a rearmament which was already under 
ý ay. ` The reaction was pursued most vigorously by Baldwin's 
second son who - after a private rebuke to an embarrassed 
Jones"' 
- published a 
biographical counterblast. Against Young's 
psychological speculations he presented Baldwin's formative 
experiences, religion, and values - although 
his candour about his 
f'ather's parents and a schoolboy scrape unintentionally stimulated 
the appetite for yet more psychological interpretations. Against 
the C hurchillian-Labour account of the 1q3os he deployed the 
best available historical source - at that time 
Parliamenlan' 
Debates 
- which those claiming 
historical authority had signally 
ignored. `'" In these ways he anticipated conclusions from later aca- 
demic research, and enabled Robert Blake to produce the first 
detached (if' plainly Conservative) assessment. -" 
Jones DL. pp. -182.,, 
27 (21-22, )än. 1 g41.2`; Dec. 1()44)- M&B pp. i tiny. i ()6., j: Baldwin 
in It. Prarson and H. Kingsmlll. T a/Icrný 0/ Dirt [1 %rlttinolun I ]()47)- p. 1 Mg. 
(: MY p. 11: Young to Did] Cooper, 22 Sept. 194ä. Gooier papers 2.1. 
R. Bassett, 'Yelling the Truth to the People. The Myth of the Baldwin «( : unfrstiion'" 
The (arnhndge Journal 2 SK-q;,, also 2'M-42- 
A. W. BaldNm, Jones letters. 2g. , {1 March lq,,, i, (: 1'1. Ad(1.7938: Jon, -, wrote that in 
a long life I can't recall receiving a letter Inch has so shaken nie'. 
A. W. Baldwin.. tli Father The True Ston (ly,,,, ). Another notahle riposte was 1). C. 
Someryell, Sianler Baldwin. 
. 
In 1: '. %arnlnatrnn !I Some Fealurr( q/ Mr. join, ', Biographi (1 gr,,; ). 
and there as a lesser-known pamphlet defence. 1). If. Barber. Stanlei Bald in (iq,, q). 
R. Blake. 'Baldwin and the Right', in. ). Ra\mond (ed. ). The Baldwin 
. -l, oe 
(Ig6o). Blake 
had earlier accepted Young's and (: hum-hill's interpretations in reviews for Braver- 
brook's Ei enlng Standard, The Disastrous Mr. Bald Ni n' (1. } Nov. 1! )., -)2) and `Was Winston 
Fair to Baldwin" (2:, Sept. icr, '; ). 
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With the opening of' government, party, and personal records 
from the late ig6os, understandings of' the interwar period 
became more properly historical. The new evidence brought 
specialist party and policy studies which stimulated fresh and 
more complicated interpretations, and in 1969 the first compre- 
hensive, fully documented, biography by Keith Middlemas and 
John Barnes. It became possible to transcend naive criticism or 
defence in favour of' understanding, and led in time to such a 
rehabilitation of Baldwin's reputation that in the 19gos a C; on- 
servative prime minister could publicly claim him as a model, and 
it Labour prime minister could speak at the dedication of'a mem- 
orial to him in Westminster Abbey. -" 
Some recent historical studies have been perceptive about Bald- 
win. '{ Nevertheless, the general effect of* interpretations since the 
i cf6os has been to re-cast him as an elusive figure. His public 
position notwithstanding, the official and private records display 
no firm and persistent imprint of him as a commanding figure. 
Contemporaries at a loss to explain his dominance frequently 
ascribed it to 'character', and subsequent accounts - from , 
Jones 
and G. M. Young onwards - have not always been more substantial 
or precise. Middlemas and Barnes's new style' oHeadership turns 
out to be little more than basic man-management. -'{ Various ver- 
sions of' an interpretation that Baldwin himself chose to project - 
'niv worst enemy would not say of me that I did not know what 
the reaction of'the English people would be to a particular course 
of action'-'' - are less explanations than evasions. To say that he 
john Major on hr(opting prime minister in iee)() and Tom Blair in his address on iS 
I)r( rnthrr ie)c); - marking the fiftieth annicrrsan of' Baldwirt's death - both invoked 
111111 as .t 'consensual' politician. fºlainh 
drasing parallels sith their own puhhe stators. 
Larlirr. in ic)t)7, Sir Ldsard Heath had slxokrn at a prisatr House of'(: oinmuns loot hewn 
to eontmc"morate the crntenarv of Baldwin's birth. ihr organising committee included 
Lord (R. A. ) Butler. Sir (: rof"frr. Iiovd, Lord and lads Davidson. and Balch. iri's surviving 
private secretaries. 
Notahl. M. cowling. The Impart Y) Labour 192n 1924 (Cambridge, 197 1), pp. 297-1oe). 
. 1()7-8.421-2. and 
The Impart o/ Ilitlrr. Brrtith Politt(% and 13rttt. sh Polirr 1933- 1940 
((: anibndi; e. 197. )), pp. 2. )9-7i: 
B. Schwarz. 'I'hr Language of (: onstittitionalism: Bald- 
%%mite" Conservatism , 
in Formations o/ Nation and People (i98.4), i-i8: 1).. Jarvis, 'Stanlr. 
Baldwin and the Idrolo, g' of the (: unsc n: u nr Krslxºttsc to Socialism. i e) t ti- t O, C( Phi) 
thesis, I. nisc"rsit. of Lancaster. 199)i: hereafter cited as jarvis thesis'). to he published 
as (. oncer, alize Ideolo, gi and the Response to Socialtsnt 1911,1931. 
M&B cit. tli, esp. PP- 488-91. K. NtiddIrnias. 'Stanlrs, Baldwin', to 11. %-an Thal (rd. ). 
The Prime Ministers. 2 soil. (iq rt), n. 2.5.5-ti. 
E. g.. \bdication speech. in SOL p. 73 (t(1 I)re. te),; h): (: ýIl' PI). . 54,1 
20. 
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embodied `Englishness' overlooks the extent to which Englishness 
has always been diverse and contested: what did Durham miners, 
Worcestershire farmers, and City financiers share: ' It also over- 
looks a rare period of* Conservative success in Scotland. 
'" Attribu- 
ting his power to some special ability to interpret and reflect 
public opinion`? assumes that `public opinion' formed something 
homogeneous, easily identifiable, and intrinsically Conservative, 
rather than divided, diffuse, and in substantial degrees reaction- 
ar\, Liberal, Labour, or socialist. Over 45 per cent of electors were 
always non- or anti-Conservative. It also assumes that 'public opi- 
nion' existed as an independent entity, rather than developing in 
dynamic relationship with what was said by the competing politi- 
cal parties, let alone the media. Ascribing Baldwin's success simply 
to the occupation of the 'centre' or `middle' of' politics presumes 
that a political `centre' pre-existed in some manifest and stable 
f'Orrn, rather than having repeatedly to he defined and constructed. 
To describe him unambiguously as `consensual', moderate, or con- 
ciliatory is to disregard periods when he deliberately sharpened 
differences, notably over the General Strike and at the 1924 and 
r O' r elections. 2' A still grander or (depending on perspective) 
more dismissive yiewv, that he encapsulated the spirit or of' the 
interwar age-"' begs similar if' larger questions. All these interpret- 
ations imply that Baldwin's conception and practice of leadership 
was essentially passive, neutral, or hollow - 
'not to create popular 
feeling', but to `react to the mood of the people's' - 
in effect, 
non-leadership. Then again, it is certainly significant that he was 
considered sincere and trustworth,, and had skills of' cominuni- 
cation on the platform and in the new mass media.; ' But these 
Blake, 'BaldNvin and tlir Right'. p. 2fi; R: unsde"n, 13a1/me and 13ald: e in. pp. -, 1For 
thr tndreattvr significancr of thr ticutttsh vote. sec R. Mc1\. ihhin, The, Ideulu(irec o/ (aas% 
(( )xfurd, t yyer), p. 2ti4. 
Ranrsden, 13a1/nrn and 13alrlu rn, pp. 207-8: S. Ball, 13a1d: ern and the (. nn. wn nlrr r Yarlt. The 
(. nNf of 1921'ý-- 1y31 {ýrý+ Haýcn, ºc)fiHº, p. 8- 
A faint v. -eil made in C. 1.. Mmvat. 'Baldwin Rrstorc"d. ",, Jnurnal n/ Modern Ilr(tori 
(1 r)5.1), 171-2. See also B. . 
'llalantrnt, 'Baldwin Rc-rrstored". ibid. 
. 
}. { (1072). y. ), and 
. 
Jarvis thesls. pp. 12-14 and ch. 6. 
1":. g. Blakr, 'Baldwin and the Right', 1º1,. 2., -6: epigraph to 
M&B. p. \-iii: 1). (: ann: finr. 
Politics. Propaganda and Art. The (: asc" of "Fwo Wurcrstrrshtrr Lads". Midland 11111117 4 
1 1977), 1()7. Ramsdrn, Ral/nur and Knldre"rn. p. 2c17: S. Ball, 'iyr fi-l t)2y'" in A. tic"Idun 
Ic"d. ), How 7nr7" (: overnrrrerNt Fall (ryc)ti), p. 2tcr. 
Ball, Baldwin and the CancPnntirr Yartr. p N. 
J. Ramsde"n, 'Baldwin and Film, in N. Prunaý and 1). W. Spring (eds. ), 1'rojrqganda. I'olrhr 
and Frlnr lyre-. t5 (1092)" Ittt. 1211-8; 1. Rurnsdc"tt,. In 
. "lhhetrle 
for 1'oicer. A Hr. rlun c>/ th, 
1O Stanley Baldwin 
describe forms of delivery, empty in themselves, rather than the 
qualities for creating a believing audience: substance and purpose. 
There are other lines of' inquiry - structural, organisational, 
sociological, ideological - which suggest that Baldwin himself mat- 
tered very little, and that his long period of prominence owed as 
much to fortunate circumstances as had his original rise to the 
premiership. The 1918 redistribution of parliamentary seats, the 
192 1 partition of Ireland, and the efficiency of' the Conservative 
party machine; the Conservative preference of newly enfranchised 
-omen voters, the broader social composition of'direct tax-payers, 
the steady rise in real incomes; the division of' the anti- 
Conservative vote, Liberal party disintegration, the troubles of' the 
first two Labour governments: together these certainly explain a 
great deal about interwar Conservative success. So, more recently, 
do important analyses of' interwar Conservative propaganda, seen 
as promoting anti-collectivist and anti-inflationary `conventional 
wisdoms' and hostile stereotypes of' the trade-unionised working 
class. ' Plainly enough, Baldwin's power and success were no more 
his own unaided creation than were those of' any other political 
leader. Yet these approaches do not register the large and distinc- 
tive impression he made upon the public mind. Nor do they accom- 
modate the widespread contemporary belief that he constituted a 
political force and an electoral asset in himself'. 
The nature of' writing about Baldwin is so peculiar that it can 
produce verdicts which are, in the strict sense of the word, incred- 
ible. Although now properly discounted as a specific explanation 
for Baldwin's calling of the 192,; election, it is still asserted as 
general interpretation that his chief' political aim, an 'obsession' 
which `sustained his career', was to exclude Lloyd George from 
office" - this when he was confronted by the rather more funda- 
mental challenges of' newly emergent socialism, direct-action 
(, oncenatire Parti crone /, Y3n ( 1908). pp. 2. _; -6: BaII, Balduvin and the Conserratire Partr, pp. 
The seminal essay is R. J1cKihhin, '(. lass and Conventional \1'isdorn: Ihr (: onsrrvatIV( 
Parts and thr "Public" in Intrr+ar Britain'. in his Ideologies of (Ja. s. s, fill. See also 
1). Jarvis. 'British (: onsrr"atism and (. lass Politics in the 102os'. English Hzsloncal Re, ieu 
iii ( 1006). ! )9-84- 
R. Blake, The (, o mmr,, alive Part from Peel to Churchill (197" r(In), pp. 220.222,227,236: 
. 
J. (: arnphrll. 'Stanlcv- Baldwin', in J. P. Mackintosh (rd. ). British Prime . 1linicters of the 
T irentiet/r (. enlun. 2 vols. ( 1977). 1. to i and passim; M. Pugh, The Making o/ Modern British 
Polities 1867--1939 (()xfo>r(l. tq 2). pp. 220.27,4: Ball, Baldwin and the, (, on. servative Partl. 
p. H. This interpretation originated w, with. Jonrs and : \rnrrV. 
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trade unionism, and aggressive totalitarian regimes. Again, we are 
told that BaldNvin's party was engaged in a `retreat from Empire' 
back to `English nationalism', and that he himself had little inter- 
est in the Empire or even the rest of Britain; 
'{ vet Conservatives 
still defined themselves as imperialist and unionist, and Baldwin 
came to be regarded as the leading imperial statesman of his time. 
A recent claim that his contribution should be understood chiefly 
in terms of' economic and social policies' is interesting in con- 
tradicting earlier interpretations, but it would have surprised 
Baldwin almost as much as the Cabinet colleagues actually 
responsible for those policies - 
Neville Chamberlain and Church- 
ill. Equally curious conclusions result when a couple of passages 
from his speeches about old-fashioned industrial paternalism and 
the English countryside - the 
last now as often quoted and anthol- 
ogised as it had been. in the interwar years - are taken to encapsu- 
late his essential themes. Martin WWti'iener, in a book influential 
among politicians and publicists in the i g8os, made him symbolic 
of' a supposed English culture of backward-looking 'anti- 
industrialism'; ") yet his party was supported by most industrialists, 
he himself' had spent twenty years helping to create a modern 
industrial firm, and he continued to own large holdings of indus- 
trial shares. Others have similarly presented Baldwin's vision as 
`unrealistic, irrelevant and escapist'. It is claimed that he had no 
ideas', and `never ... could 
be bothered to go to the heart of his 
country's problems'; '' yet this was a leader who not only survived 
intense public scrutiny for fourteen years, but commanded wide- 
spread respect. Such has been the poverty of* the interpretative 
tradition that it could produce Robert Skidelsky's glib paradox: 
'the most interesting thing about Stanley Baldwin is that he was 
completely uninteresting'. " 
M. Pugh. The Tor e. and the People 188o- 19 35 (Oxford. i r)8,, ), pp. 184- 1 also Pugh. 
. 
11akin. o/ Modern Bntish Polrhn, pp. 27 -S. 2q(: Call JAW ll. 'Bald%%111 . p. 
21 o: Ramsdcn, 
Ilal four and Balder err. pp. 211-I ,;. 
A. Seldon, '(: onscn-ativc (: enturv', in A. Seddon and S. Ball (cds. ). Conservative (: rntun 
(Oxford, 1994), Irl). :4 2-4 
- 
NI. J. Wiener, I: ný/tsh Culture and the Decline of the Industrial . S'prrrt I85O- 1980 (Cambridge. 
1 O81 ), pp. 100-2, and index 1). 211. 
I). (: annadinc. 'Politics, Propaganda and Art. pp. 104-,: Campbell. 'Baldwin'. pp. 210, 
2 16. 
R. Skidclskv. Interests and Obse%oon. Selected Essars (lyy,; ). p. 1,, from his repieý. of R. 
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III 
The present study proceeds from the view that so dominant a 
politician cannot be uninteresting; that on the contrary study of 
Baldwin raises central historical questions which if intelligently 
addressed can reveal much about Conservatism and the broader 
political culture of' the interwar years. It contains an account of' 
Baldv in's mature career, and an examination of' his early life. It 
is not, however, a biography, in the conventional sense of' being 
structured as the chronicle of a life. This is not simply because 
Baldwin already has numerous biographers, but rather because of 
scepticism about the value of biography - certainly as applied in 
the relentless flow of' biographies on twentieth-century British 
politicians. Indeed, the unusual character of Baldwin's leadership 
makes him an especially difficult subject fur traditional biography, 
in ways which expose the shortcomings of the genre. 
Biographical information is manifestly important for under- 
standing political leadership, and full-scale biographies may be 
valuable in opening the study of recent periods and subjects where 
documented research has not previously been undertaken. But 
once more broadly researched historical studies have proceeded, 
biography rarely brings further illumination. Narration of a life is 
easy on the mind of author and reader, but it is not obviously a 
powerful or even an effective form of explanation. Too often it is 
a substitute for such explanation. All accounts of' the past are 
abstractions of some kind, but the tendency of political biography 
is to abstract in particularly misleading ways. For all political lead- 
ers are enveloped and entangled within a mass of' pressures and 
expectations - from colleagues, civil servants, their own party acti- 
vists, and their opponents; from Parliament, the media, sectional 
groups, voters; from different and sometimes conflicting policies, 
and from the unpredictable and often irresistible force of' events. 
In reacting to such pressures, thew cannot escape being substan- 
tially diverted and shaped by them. Their careers lose the linear 
and self-propelled trajectory assumed by biography. It is a com- 
nmonplace that Baldwin's political eminence could never have been 
predicted from his life before October 1922; but it is equally true 
that if' he could have substantially controlled his own career it 
would on several occasions have taken quite different courses from 
those it actually took between May 1 923 and May 1937- 
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Then again, the imperative task of political persuasion and the 
weight of party and electoral expectations mean that political lea- 
ders partly create for themselves, and partly have imposed upon 
them, a public personality. This constructed or imagined persona 
has unusual properties. It may have only tenuous links with the 
politician's private personality, yet it becomes a force in itself, 
which the individual feels he must respect or trv to exploit, and 
which in some sense he becomes. Quite literally, the lives of lead- 
ing politicians are not their own. It is not, therefore, self-evident 
that examination of psychological development - aside 
from the 
obvious evidential problems it raises - reveals much of genuine 
significance for a public career. Moreover, as few politicians are 
able to impose themselves sufficiently and for long enough to 
affect the course and character of a political system, so only a few 
deserve more biographical attention than can be supplied by a 
good Dictionan' of . Vational Biography' entry. The limitations of the 
genre are indicated by the way that all extended political bio- 
graphies - notably the thousand pages of 
Middlemas and Barnes 
on Baldwin - are 
drawn inexorably into descriptions of the `times', 
in attempts to supply meaning for their accounts of' the 
In principle, the most complete understanding of' major poli- 
ticians would seem to require two complementary approaches. 
One is the study of' `high politics' - 
in the interpretative, not 
simply descriptive, sense, where the narrative is not of one poli- 
tician nor even of one party, but rather of the whole system of 
political leadership. Here individuals are placed within the full 
multi-party and multi-policy contexts which properly explain the 
details of their careers. Such high-political accounts now exist for 
almost the whole period of Baldwin's leadership. " Their insights - 
the remorseless situational and tactical pressures, the chronic 
uncertainties, and the short horizons which afflict all political 
leadership 
- are taken 
for granted here. 
The second approach, followed in this book, is that appropriate 
for the small number of politicians who, by their originality as well 
as importance, merit extended individual attention. It seeks to go 
beyond biographical narrative, in order to ask questions about the 
(: uvdhng. Impact aJ Lahour 1920- 1924, Y. Williamsun.. Vatr(onal and . 
Tat urral (: rrrrrn 
men! Britrdh Politics. the Econorn) and Empire- 1y26 1932 (Cambridge. 10g2): (: O%%-Iing. 
Impact o/ Ilitler 1933- 1940. The best statement of 't hr character of' high politics' is in 
tlhe first. nn. e-12- 
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nature and practice of political leadership. The qualities that 
really distinguish and explain a politician's effectiveness are mani- 
fested less in the linear succession of' particular events than in 
longer-term consistencies or patterns which, as the narrative 
suspensions in the best biographies indicate, are revealed more 
effectively by an analytical, rather than narrative, structure. More 
particularly, these qualities are likely to be revealed in speeches - 
in public presentation and argument. 
Attention to speeches is part of the originality claimed here. 
Speech - political rhetoric - has rarely been the main source 
material for recent historical work. "' This is partly because insuf- 
ficient thought is given to matching sources and questions: ques- 
tions are addressed to inappropriate sources, or else particular 
sources are approached with questions to which they cannot supply 
answers. It is also because the 'reality' of political leadership is 
presumed to reside overwhelmingly among the private or organis- 
ational evidence of' letters, diaries, memoranda, and minutes, so 
that - except for the occasional major pronouncement - speeches 
or other public statements are treated as supplementary or 
inferior sources. Where the questions are to do with policy forma- 
tion, decision-making, party tactics, private opinion, and detailed 
motivation, this is obviously correct. Here public statements will 
not yield answers. Historians do not assume that a politician's 
speech - or article or book - states the complete or even partial 
grounds for a particular action, nor that it reveals his full, or even 
any, belief about a specific issue. For these aspects of' politics, the 
problematic nature of speeches and publications as public and rhe- 
torical statements - necessarily concerned more with persuasion 
and concealment than with description and explanation - is well 
understood. 
Yet amidst the rich private evidence it can be forgotten that 
politicians are not just policy-makers, tacticians, and adminis- 
trators. They are also public figures for whom speech-making and 
publication is a principal function, precisely because politics is a 
public activity and because they need to win support for them- 
Fur tiut; gc"stnr cummc"rºts on thc" sºguificancc and pussihihtic"s of such material, see M. 
Brntlcy, 'Parth-, I)octrinc and ThuuKht', in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson (eds. ). High and 
Luu Polctºcc ºn Modern Britain (()xf'urd. ºyH {), pp. º2,; -, º°i and H. 
C. G. ! 11. ºtthcýc, 'Rhe"t- 
uric and Politics in Great Britain, ºSfic>-tin 1). J. 11'allcr (rd. ), Politio and Social 
(. han. ýP ºn Modern Britain (Brighton, t c)fi i), pp. 
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selves, their parties, and their causes. It can as easily 
he forgotten 
that while historians can observe the inner Workings of' part}- and 
government, these were hidden from all except a tiny number of 
contemporaries. Everyone else could only `know' and respond to 
political leaders through their constructed and projected public 
characters, especially as revealed by speeches and media presen- 
tation. For this reason, those politicians who work only at their 
correspondence arid only in committees will not usually go far. 
What distinguishes political leaders from backbenchers or officials 
are the party, public, or parliamentary reputations acquired by 
public utterance. This is what creates their ability to become 
policy-makers and strategists; and their power to affect party and 
national affairs continues to be largely dependent upon this 
capacity f'or public persuasion. 
So, in an important sense, politicians are what they speak and 
publish. \\'hat they- say may often be the collective party line, but 
leaders arc normally such because they add something distinctive 
and persuasive, causing particular importance to he attached to 
themselves not just b\ their own party and supporters but by 
opposing parties and other bodies too. These things most obviously 
consist of observations on issues and policies, and challenges or 
replies to opponents and rivals. But speeches also have a deeper 
function. They place the issues and tactics of the moment within 
the wider interests and values, the fears and antipathies, the his- 
tories and the purposes that constitute both a party's claims for 
support and an individual's claim to significance - which 
have vari- 
ously been called ideolony, doctrine or, more recently, 'language'. " 
These may be intellectually rigorous and original, though nc: ormall\- 
they are not. Their function is not to satisfy academic tests as 
theory, but to attract and hold the support of diverse audiences 
possessing a range od conventional beliefs and present interests, 
as well as hopes f0r the Future. Nevertheless, in these utterances 
political leaders may well be imaginative and creative. They seek 
to form particular understandings of current conditions, and to 
Sonic sm tal and electoral IIiSUUI lass, chstllusionrd in structural and es1>reialh class 
analýcrc, have rrcc"ntk taken the so-called 'Iiniuistie turn'. offering examination of pol- 
ttual languagr' - and 
hence the crratiNc rcilr of politicians and ihr state In political 
cultutr - as a major advan<i' 
in undrrst. utdutg. Yet such rnaphasrs had been central to 
the earlier 'high I>olrtic. ' ctudirs, so often disparaged hv such historians. See es! >. lug. 
Impact )f Labour, pp. ;, -to. and 
Brntle\, '1 art\, 1)octrittr and '1'hourht'. 
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define issues in certain was. They aim to persuade their audi- 
ences to want, expect, or fear new things - or old things for new 
reasons, or new things for old reasons. They encourage them to 
adopt new beliefs and detect new friends or enemies - or else to 
hold fast to familiar values, allies, and enmities. By these means 
they not only shape opinions on particular issues, but create more 
lasting political identities and electoral alliances. It is by these 
means that a political `centre' or `consensus' may come into exist- 
ence - not simply from the momentum of events or structural 
change, but by the constructive and collective efforts of successful 
politicians, forming areas of agreement and selecting points of 
difference. 
Given that speeches have these persuasive and instrumental 
functions, they may or may not express aspects of' the speaker's 
private belief'. In judging how far private belief' may be a likely 
and significant component, personal correspondence and diaries 
can provide assistance. But private records concerned with the 
stream of'events do not in themselves necessarily or even usually 
contain extended evidence about belief', because by their very 
nature as private statements any belief is chiefly left implicit, a 
matter of' silent assumption. Belief is more likely to he indicated 
in underlying and consistent themes, in the wider f'rarnework and 
texture of* responses to particular events, as revealed where the 
politician is compelled to make concessions towards explicitness - 
in long series of'speeches and publications. 
British party ideologies or doctrines have almost invariably been 
investigated through examination of' `thinkers' and `writers' who 
produced quasi-academic theoretical tracts. As Conservatives have 
generated f'eww major `thinkers' and as Conservative politicians 
rarely acknowledge the influence even of' lesser `thinkers', there 
has been widespread acceptance of their routine insistence that - 
w"ith, perhaps, the exceptional case of' `Thatcherism' - Conserva- 
tism has no ideology or theory, but is unique (and they would 
claim superior) in being `empirical', `instinctive', `practical', or 
`realistic'. This has been compounded b\- many political historians 
having a depleted conception of' what is `political', which is 
reduced to programmes, policies, and organisation. It has been 
further aggravated by limited assumptions about the elements in 
`electoral behaviour', narrowed to the structural determinants of 
`class' or, most recently, gender. The broader character of political 
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activity and electoral choice, the context of argument and imagery 
derived from a rich and varied political culture, remains under- 
explored. 
" Insofar as the existence of Conservative ideas has been 
acknowledged, these have usually been presented as large abstrac- 
tions, unrelated to specific political cultures and arguments, and 
so appearing to be bland, banal, and toothless. Accordingly histor- 
ies of the Conservative party rarely consider `ideas' or `thought' a 
worthwhile subject fi)r study. Yet the notion that Conservatism 
was just an empty container filled and re-filled by the expediencies 
of' the moment is inherently implausible. It has been wcll said 
that the party's claim to be non-ideological is itself an ideological 
statement. '; But what must also be understood is that party doc- 
trine or ideology has always been generated much less by `think- 
ers' than by politicians themselves; that within the Conservative 
party its collective leaders and Central Office stall'-were those who 
most publicly and persistently sought to persuade large audiences 
that Conservative ideas and values were superior to those of their 
various opponents. 
This book therefore makes considerable use of Bald%vin's 
speeches - 
both the large number which are obviously political 
stateniernts, and his many ostensibly `non-political' addresses. The 
precise extent to which he expressed a distinctive political mess- 
age is hard to assess, because no other leading interwar politician 
has been examined in this manner. A historical literature which 
Would allow adequate comparison does not yet exist. Nevertheless 
it has always been plain that Baldwin possessed a public character 
quite unlike - and much more widely admired than - that of any 
other contemporary politician. The argument here is that its 
essential elements lay in two features: the unusual emphasis his 
speeches and addresses gave to deeper, doctrinal, concerns, and 
the particular substance and tone of' this doctrine. Together these 
gave Baldwin an ability to appear free from party interests and 
Sr(, however, F. O'(; ornian. British Consrn alum. Con, ser atire 7hou, aht from Burke to Thatcher 
rc)Hfi) - an anthology .. 
hich includes passagrs hv Bald%Vin. with srnsihlr cou n entan, 
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high-political pressures -a position with great potential strengths, 
but also liable to cause difficulties. 
Baldwin's speeches have not been wholly ignored by biographers 
and historians. As four volumes of his addresses were published 
and as several of his phrases and passages remain well known, it 
has long been recognised that they indicate something important. 
Yet even apart from the general undervaluation of speeches as 
historical evidence, Baldwin has suffered from remarkably naive, 
selective, and uncontextualised readings of' his words. " His Nov- 
ember 1936 reference to rearmament is just the most obvious 
instance. Other persistent sources of misunderstanding are those 
of Nla\- 1924 on the English countryside, and March 1925 on the 
Baldwin ironworks. Even catch phrases - such as `dynamic force' 
or 'Safety First' - have been misconstrued or misattributed. 
Another, lesser, example is indicative of- the obstacles facing seri- 
ous discussion of- Baldwin. It has long been a social-historical 'fact', 
derived from his own words, that as an old Harrovian he deter- 
mined to pack his first Cabinet with former Harrow pupils. Yet 
what should have been evident f-rom such an improbable state- 
ment is confirmed by any intelligent reading of' the reprinted 
address containing the statement, and proven by the original 
newspaper report punctuated throughout with the words `laugh- 
ter' and `cheers' - that the comment was, quite simply, a joke. ') 
Iv 
The principal aim of this book is to examine a Conservative politi- 
cal mind, and a particular- form of party leadership. It is an investi- 
gation of political power considered not simply in terms of 
decisions in Cabinet or party councils, but as relationships estab- 
lished with various public audiences, including the opposing par- 
ties. The approach is therefore deliberately selective. Tactical 
activities now familiar from the 'high politics' accounts are noted 
where appropriate, but the emphasis is upon a political rhetoric 
and the presentation of a public personality. As these constituted 
Exceptions arc Schwarz. `l"hr Language of (: onstit tit ionalism". and, Jarvis Ihrsis. ch. ti: 
also P. Williamson, 'The I)cx trinal Politics of StanIv% Baldwin, in M. Bentlev (ed. ). 1'uhhc 
and Fri tale 1)nefnne ((: arnbrulgc". i yy,; ), pp. 18 1 -2O8. 
01" 1)- 2(37: The Times, 2o, Juh" 102,;. Omission of audience reactions in Baldwin's col- 
Irctrd addresses has contributed to other misreadinvs. 
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a major attempt to elevate Conservative leadership into an articu- 
lation of `national' values, this book is also a study of a Conserva- 
tive public doctrine. 
Nevertheless, because Baldwin's career has attracted so much 
controversy and misunderstanding, a necessary preliminary - the 
first chapter - 
is to re-examine its course and its chief episodes. 
Here as elsewhere specific misconceptions and factual errors have 
been addressed in the notes, in order to avoid cluttering the text. 
The second chapter begins the task of defining the qualities of 
Baldwin's leadership, chiefly by it process of elimination but with 
the effect of' emphasising its peculiarities. Because he displayed 
such an unusual combination of political characteristics, chapters 
;; and :} 
investigate their sources - 
in what is intended as a model 
of* how examination of an interwar politician's early life can genu- 
inely and effectively illuminate his career. Chapter 5 describes 
Baldwin's public assessment of'the situation he thought it was his 
task to address, in order to indicate his purposes and his practice. 
The next five chapters then analyse more fully the various aspects 
of his firm of' Conservative doctrine. These chapters proceed 
largely from Baldwin's own perspective and quote extensively from 
his speeches, because this enables his intentions, meanings, and 
'tone' - the texture of 
its presentation - to 
be most clearly under- 
stood. It also allows the substance and range of'Conservative argu- 
inents to be more fully explicated, reaching beyond familiar 
emphases on `economics' and `class' to the constitution, to family, 
local and patriotic loyalties, to empire, ethics, and religion. The 
conclusion considers why Baldwin came to occupy a pre-eminent 
national position, and assesses his contributions to the Conserva- 
tive party's interwar success and to public life more generally. 
The starting point is to place Baldwin in his contemporary con- 
texts. If' this procedure seems obvious, it must be said that these 
contexts are neither those of' the 'Baldwin' constructed during the 
tqMos and early 195os, nor those of the 'Baldwin' that has con- 
founded late twentieth-century social-democratic, statist, and 
secularised sensibilities. The actual Baldwin of the 192os and 
1930s must be understood as a man firmed by a particular Vic- 
torian and Edwardian culture - comprising not 
just narrowly 'pol- 
it ical' experiences but also industrial, moral, religious, and literary 
influences 
- who responded 
in a distinctive manner to the shocks 
and challenges which that culture suffered during the Great War 
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and its aftermath. He must also be understood by grasping the 
full implications of a truism: that what has since 1940 become 
known and familiar was in the interwar period new and unknown; 
that mass democracy, the Labour party, and trade unions could 
seem to threaten property, private enterprise, and national 
cohesion; that a second war of' mechanised slaughter was feared 
as ArmaLreddon. vet believed to be avoidable. 
